NRI Annual Review 2024 - Flipbook - Page 34
example, but also in their use
of new equipment that could be
昀椀rst of a kind, as well as in new
ways to deploy, where modular
construction may result in the
assembly and deployment of
technologies in large number
across different countries.
Developers may also introduce
new approaches, such as remote
or autonomous plant operation
and maintenance. All of this
changes the context of safety,
so the IAEA are now trying to
revise and adjust their safety
standards to make them more
encompassing. The IAEA are also
sharing good practice on the new
technologies, explaining how
typical safety approaches could
be applied to new features.
One of the approaches involves
a roadmap for IAEA member
states on how to license a
nuclear installation. Typically,
a regulatory body will assess
the safety of a facility and the
capability of the operating
organisation, and then decide
whether that facility can be
given a license to operate or
not. For new technologies there
are a number of issues that
require additional regulatory
considerations. For example,
because of the new commercial
arrangements in which some of
these technologies may be used
for industrial purposes, it may be
that the operating organisation
normally responsible for safety
may have additional stakeholders
who could challenge their status
or approach. In addition, some
of these novel reactors may be
located within new industrial
installations, or may even be
relocated to different sites over
time. Some of these technologies
are also going to be deployed in
昀氀eets or in modules. This means
the way in which regulators
consider the site environment
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will require additional steps
within the licensing process.
The IAEA review included an
industry track that looks at
approaches to standardised
design, and a regulatory
track that considers how
regulators could work together
internationally to try to increase
licensing review ef昀椀ciency.
Within the regulatory track,
one key task was to work
out a framework for sharing
information when regulators
are reviewing the same type
of technology under their own
national regulations. A more
ambitious activity is trying
to de昀椀ne a process by which
multiple regulators will assess
the same design as part of a
single team with a single review
outcome, thereby avoiding
duplication.
Nuclear liability
regimes
Beyond new nuclear technology,
it is also important to highlight
the work that the OECD’s Nuclear
Energy Agency, speci昀椀cally
its nuclear law department,
has been doing on the liability
regime associated with geological
disposal. This area is an ongoing
challenge and is coming back
into strong focus as the future
role of nuclear becomes clearer.
The OECD shared a related,
and equally key, report on Deep
Geological Repositories (DGRs)
and nuclear liability.
The question of the civil liability
regime applicable to this kind
of repository has been raised by
many stakeholders, who want
to understand the legal risks
associated with the operation
and post-operation phases of
these facilities, and particularly
how these risks can be mitigated.
New build
contracting still
has uncertain
timelines, and in
many countries
there is ongoing
ambiguity about
the amount of
nuclear that will be
included in energy
security and
decarbonisation
strategies.
Such questions are clearly also
of interest to a broader audience,
such as local communities,
suppliers and insurers.
It is generally agreed that
existing nuclear liability regimes
will apply to DGRs during their
operational phase. However,
the applicability of such regimes
during the post-closure phase
requires further consideration.
It depends on which nuclear
liability convention would apply
given the very long lifetime of
these installations; their unique
risk pro昀椀le; whether there is
a liable entity to compensate
victims in case of a nuclear
incident; and the level and
duration of oversight and control
over the installation concerned.
Another important issue for
the DGR operators relates to
the funding for nuclear liability
coverage. The NEA’s report
focuses exclusively on the
application of the legal regimes
for third-party liability for
nuclear damage, and does not
