Sasol Integrated Report 2023 - Book - Page 73
INTRODUCTION
ABOUT SASOL
CREATING VALUE
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW
PERFORMANCE
ADMINISTRATION
GOVERNANCE AND REWARDS
REMUNERATION REPORT CONTINUED
REMUNERATION AT A GLANCE CONTINUED
Remuneration Policy summary and outcomes
EMOLUMENTS
STRATEGIC INTENT
Fixed pay
Short-term incentives1
• Attraction and retention
of key employees
• Promote value creation including
safe and sustainable performance
• Internal equity and
external competitiveness
• Alignment with Group and Business
financial and non-financial
performance targets
• Recognition of relative
individual performance,
experience and competence
• Benchmarked to location
market median
Fixed pay
Long-term incentives1
• Cash/base salary
and benefits
• Attraction and retention of
senior employees and scarce
and critical skills
• Alignment with shareholders’
long-term interests
• Personal performance is used as a
multiplier in the final calculation
• Market related total package
• Additional penalty for fatalities
• Additional performance targets are
linked to 65% of the award which
have to be achieved to trigger vesting
of the award
• Three- to-five-year vesting periods
• All permanent employees
• All permanent employees excluding
Mining employees participating in a
production bonus plan
• Monthly/bi-weekly
(United States only)
Short-term incentives
• Annually in September
• Cash or equity-settled
(Region dependent)
• Chief Financial Officer: 200%
• Vested LTIs to be retained (after settlement of taxes)
until MSR is achieved
• Other Executive Directors and Prescribed Officers: 100%
• 18-month post-cessation shareholding requirements
OUTCOMES
Fixed pay
Non-bargaining unit
• Annual salary increases
granted were aligned
with or below inflation
for employees outside
of collective bargaining
sectors
Long-term incentives
• Senior management and above
Bargaining unit
• Typically for employees
covered by collective
bargaining agreements
increases awarded were
slightly higher than the
consumer price index
(CPI) inflation
FREQUENCY OF PAYMENT/SETTLEMENT
Fixed pay
• Cash
• President and CEO: 300%
ELIGIBILITY
Short-term incentives
Long-term incentives
MINIMUM SHAREHOLDING REQUIREMENT (MSR) % OF ANNUAL PENSIONABLE
REMUNERATION AT THE TIME OF APPOINTMENT
• Minimum shareholding and postcessation shareholding requirements
for Executive Directors and
Prescribed Officers
Fixed pay
Short-term incentives
Long-term incentives
• Subject to achievement of
performance and time targets:
• Senior management and leadership:
three years
• Senior leadership performance
shares:
• 50% after three years
Short-term incentives
• President and CEO
and CFO: 65,5% (after
adjusting for fatalities)
• Other Executive
Directors and Prescribed
Officers varying between
64% and 69,82% (after
adjusting for fatalities)
• Rest of employees:
calculated on a weighted
average basis dependent
on combined Group and
Business performance
varying between
60,17% and 75,34%
(after adjusting for
fatalities, to be applied in
accordance with policy)
Long-term incentives (LTIs)
• LTIs granted in FY21, subject to corporate performance
targets (CPTs) will vest at 67,34% in FY24. This excludes
the performance against the climate change target.
As previously reported, among these CPTs was a target
of implementing 200MW of renewable energy capacity
by 30 November 2023. Despite, by 12 June 2023, having
signed Power purchase agreements (PPAs) for nearly
775MW of renewable projects, Sasol’s ability to deliver
on this target was hampered by a number of factors
which included the inclusion of Air Liquide as a partner
in our Secunda renewable energy programme (post the
sale of the air separation units), severely restricted grid
capacity and being one of the largest renewable energy
(RE) procurers in the country, setting the benchmark for
securing these type of transactions. Although the most
recent relaxation of the NERSA licensing requirement
benefitted the programme, the June 2023 Eskom
announcement on the Interim grid capacity allocation
rules (IGCAR) has led to the Committee deciding to
postpone an assessment of performance against the
renewable energy target, until more clarity is available
in this regard.
• The Committee pro-actively requested an independent
assessment of potential windfall gains on the FY21 LTI
awards. On the basis of the independent assessment,
the Committee agreed that no windfall gain arose as
the subsequent recovery of the share price coincides
with the business recovery as well as the corresponding
improvement in total shareholders’ return over
the period.
• 50% after additional two years
• Group Executive Committee (GEC)
performance shares:
• 50% after three years
• 50% after additional two years
• restricted shares after five years
1
Clawback and Malus policy applies to all variable pay awards and is being reviewed to align with latest SEC and NYSE requirements
SASOL INTEGRATED REPORT 2023
72
