create a hostile work environment and that it was the only isolated incident attributed tothe defendant itself. The court determined that the EEOC failed to state a claim forhostile work environment because the alleged conduct was not severe or pervasive.The court noted that the EEOC failed to allege that the defendant knew or should haveknown about the subsequent alleged co-worker harassment, and, even if it was, thecomplained-of conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to give rise to a hostilework environment claim. Id. at *9. As to the EEOC’s allegation that the harassmentexperienced by Sellers culminated in his constructive discharge, the court ruled thatsince the EEOC failed to state a claim for a hostile work environment, it also failed tostate a claim for constructive discharge. For these reasons, the court grantedDefendant’s motion to dismiss.In EEOC v. SDI Of Mineola, LLC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163289 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17,2022), the Commission filed an action on behalf of several female claimants allegingthat the defendant subjected them to harassment and discrimination on the basis oftheir sex in violation of Title VII. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,and the Magistrate Judge recommended that the court deny the motion. The EEOCasserted that the defendant subjected female employees to sexual harassment, whichultimately lead to several claimants’ constructive discharge. The EEOC contended thatLeston Juarez (LJ), the former co-manager of the defendant, sexually harassed theclaimants. As to the EEOC’s prima facie claim for hostile work environment, thedefendant argued that LJ’s behavior was not severe or pervasive and that thecomplained of conduct was not based on sex. Id. at *3. The defendant furthercontended that it maintained a written harassment policy that claimants failed to utilizeand that it was unaware of any alleged harassment or discrimination. Finally, thedefendant argued that the two claimants who resigned from their employment could notestablish that they were constructively discharged. The EEOC stated that LJ’sharassment was based on the claimants’ sex (female) because he primarily targetedwomen and that the conduct was frequent, severe, threatening, and altered the workenvironment. Id. at *4-5. The Magistrate Judge noted that whether the claimantsreasonably felt compelled to quit was a fact question for the jury and thus the defendantwas not entitled to summary judgment on the issue. Further, the Magistrate Judgerecognized that the defendant had an anti-harassment policy in place but determinedthat there was still a genuine question of material fact as to whether the defendantexercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassingbehavior. Id. at *22. The Magistrate Judge also found that the EEOC sufficientlyadduced summary judgment evidence to create a question of fact regarding whether thedefendant properly implemented the harassment policy. Finally, the defendant assertedthat it could not have acted with malice or reckless indifference when no owner ormember of upper management had knowledge of the alleged discriminatory conduct.The Magistrate Judge rejected this argument. It held that a reasonable jury could inferthat the defendant acted in the face of a perceived risk and violation of each claimants’rights under Title VII. Id. at *37. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge ruled that becausethere existed genuine issues of fact, the defendant was not entitled to summaryjudgment on the issue of punitive damages. For these reasons, the Magistrate Judgerecommended denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.32© Duane Morris LLP 2023The EEOC Litigation Review – 2023
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